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Why do newcomers vote for a newcomer? Support for an immigrant party

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the voters of DENK, the first immigrant party to gain seats in a national parliament. It builds further on the existing literature on how immigrants and people from immigrant descent vote in Western European countries. From the literature we derive seven expectations about the kind of voters that are likely to vote for an immigrant party in terms of their political cynicism, attitudes towards economic, globalisation and moral issues. We find that DENK voters are younger Muslims, who have conservative views on moral matters, cynical attitudes towards politics, right-wing views on economic matters and progressive views on issues that pertain to the globalisation dimension, such as immigration, integration and Islam and in particular discrimination. This article uses VAA data to construct a matched sample that in terms of key variables is representative for voters with and without a migration background.

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1. Introduction

For years, the established wisdom in the study of the voting of citizens with a migration background was that they voted for social democratic and other left-wing parties (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Wüst 2011). This was backed up by empirical evidence from all over Western Europe (Anwar 2001, 538; Bergh and Björklund 2011; Michon and Tillie 2011; Schmidtke 2016).¹ Authors have tended to emphasise that this voting behaviour is reasonable from a classical Downsian perspective, as these voters tend to have left-wing economic preferences (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011, 10–11). At the same time these voters are also mobilised through ethnic networks (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Social-democratic parties promoted the interest of immigrants and citizens with a migration background more than other established parties and fielded the more candidates with a migration background (Berger et al. 2000). So far, parties that specifically sought to mobilise citizens with a migration background as citizens with a migration background have not been successful. That was the case, until the Dutch general election 2017, when DENK, the first party of, by and for citizens with a migration background, won three seats. This is the first party of its kind to win parliamentary seats in national

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elections.^{2,3} The core question of this paper is what kind of electorate this party has been able to mobilise. In other words: *why do voters vote for a party for, by and of citizens with a migration background?*

This paper engages with three different literatures: the literature on how immigrants and citizens with a migration background vote, the literature on the social-democratic decline and the literature on new and transforming cleavage structures in Western Europe. This political party that mobilises migrants and voters with a migration background is not just a unique kind of party in West European politics, its electoral success also presents a fundamental shift in the nature of how citizens with a migration background think about politics and participate politically. DENK represents a new form of political participation for voters with a migration background, as we will see below. This party particularly appeals to younger immigrant voters, where before voters with migration backgrounds tended to vote for parties that were predominantly staffed and supported by citizens without a migrant background. DENK is the first party of, by and for citizens with a migration background to win national parliamentary representation. This creates opportunities to test the existing expectations about the political participation of citizens with a migration background, and role of for instance their ideological dimensions concerning economics, morality and globalisation.

Second, the dominance of social-democratic parties in immigrant communities meant that citizens with a migration background who sought to influence politics and society had to be willing to work with or within the social-democratic party framework (Vermeulen, Michon, and Tillie 2014, 247). Traditionally, the social-democratic electoral coalition has been broad, including blue-collar working-class voters and white-collar middle-class and intellectual voters, as well as supporters with a migration background. The centre-left needed to balance appealing to the non-migrant working class, cosmopolitan higher educated voters and immigrant communities by adopting catch-all strategies (Krouwel 2012). Working-class voters share the economic policies of social-democrats but tend to be less cosmopolitan, or even authoritarian. The politicisation of the issue of immigration represents a major dilemma for social-democrats (Bale et al. 2010; Schmidtke 2016, 398): do they maintain their traditional working-class base or do they build on constituencies of voters with a migration background and higher educated voters? The expectation that voters with a migration background are loyal to social-democrats and do not have many other options, forms an important part of the electoral calculus of social-democratic party strategists. The weakening support for social-democratic parties among voters with a migration background, for example in the form of immigrant parties, is one of a number possible contributing factor to the decline of the social-democrats across Europe.

Third, the formation of immigrant parties can be seen as part of the changing cleavage structure in West European countries. Kriesi et al. (2008) see the rise of a globalisation cleavage that poses those who favour and oppose globalisation. Immigration is one of the phenomena that co-constitutes globalisation. So far this literature has seen immigrants as objects to which citizens without a migration background respond. This article actually looks at how attitudes towards globalisation, immigration and discrimination shape the voting behaviour of voters with a migration background themselves. There has been limited research into the question how issue dimensions affect political behaviour of voters with a migration background in Western Europe (but see Bergh and Bjørklund 2011). Moreover, this party under study here developed in a country where immigration

as a political issue was already strongly politicised for decades by the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) and several anti-immigrant predecessors. DENK seeks to offer immigrant voters protection in response to this anti-immigrant mobilisation of the populist right.

This article has the following structure. First, we look at the existing literature on voting by immigrants and citizens with a migration background to derive hypotheses about what kind of voters an immigrant party such as DENK may mobilise. Then, we will discuss the method that we will use to study the voting for this party. Next, we will discuss our analyses and draw conclusions about our hypotheses and more in general about cleavage politics, social-democracy and the voting behaviour of voters with a migration background.

2. Theory

In the literature on the participation of minorities in politics there are two approaches: the ethnic approach and the class-based approach (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; Bloemraad and Vermeulen 2014). The core of the ethnic approach is that in political participation of immigrant groups can be explained by differences in the political cultures of these groups (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011, 10). Networks of kinship organisations socialise their members into a specific set of civic virtues. This socialisation can help to explain why voters of some specific ethnicity vote as a bloc, despite the fact among voters without an immigration background, such group loyalties are declining (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011, 313). Ethnic voters may use a ‘racial utility heuristic’ (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011, 10): they use the interest of their group as a proxy of their own individual interest. One element of this racial utility heuristic is that voters with a migration background tend to vote for candidates of their own ethnicity (Fisher et al. 2015, 30). Under the Dutch system of (semi-)open party lists this quite common (Van Heelsum, Michon, and Tillie 2016, 38–30). This ‘racial utility heuristic’ can also be used to explain why voters with a migration background vote for candidates without a migration background from social-democratic parties, as long as these parties have the image that they seek to advocate the interests of migrant communities. One aspect of political culture is social capital. Networks of specific immigrant civil organisations socialise their members into civic virtues, which are transferred to their community as a whole (Fennema and Tillie 1999). All in all, we would expect mechanisms like the racial utility heuristic, and socialisation into ethnic civic networks to drive citizens with a migration background to vote for an immigrant party.

1. *Migrant Hypothesis*: Voters with a migration background are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than voters without a migration background.

As observed above, this social capital based approach was used to explain the level of integration of some groups. Social trust is translated into political trust, once the elected representatives of ethnic groups participated in the local political system (Michon and Vermeulen 2009, 259). In this way the political trust of citizens in such immigrant networks, was likely to increase as part of their political integration (Tillie 2004, 530). At the same time, these networks may lead to isolation as people of one ethnicity only socialise with people of the same ethnicity (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 716). This may undermine their participation in the broader community and mutual trust. Citizens with a migration

background who have lower political trust therefore are less likely to vote for an established party and therefore are more likely to vote for an immigrant party. This adds to a general pattern that dissatisfaction with established parties drives voting for a new party (Lago and Martinez 2010).

2. *Political Cynicism Hypothesis:* Among voters with a migration background those who are more politically cynical are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than those who are less politically cynical.

The class-based approach argues that, rather than ethnicity, it is social-economic status that determines whether and how ethnic voters participate in politics (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011, 10–11). Migrant political behaviour can be understood from their relatively weak position on the labour market. So citizens with a migration background may have lower turn-out rates because voters with lower social-economic status tend to have lower turn-out rates. Immigrants and citizens with a migration background tend to have a lower social-economic status, and therefore they had more left-wing economic views, leading them to vote for social-democratic parties (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011, 312–313; Michon and Tillie 2011, 77). On moral issues (the ‘old cultural dimension’ in political science terminology) many immigrants and citizens with a migration background have more conservative, traditionalist positions (De la Garza and Cortina 2007; Sobolewska 2005, 204). An immigrant party is therefore more likely to be successful among voters that have an ideological profile that deviates from social-democratic parties. So immigrant voters that have relatively right-wing views on economic issues and conservative views on moral issues compared to other members of their community are more likely to vote for an immigrant party: immigrant voters that have relatively left-wing economic views and progressive moral views compared to other members of their community are more likely to remain loyal to social-democrats.

3. *Moral Dimension Hypothesis:* Among voters with a migration background those who have more conservative views on the moral dimension are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than those with more progressive views on the moral dimension.
4. *Economic Dimension Hypothesis:* Among voters with a migration background those who have more right-wing views on the economic dimension are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than those with more left-wing views on the economic dimension.

The electoral success of an immigrant party can also be seen as part of the political polarisation of globalisation. The underlying idea is that the pressures of increased immigration create a new cleavage in West European politics between those who favour national demarcation and those who embrace globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2008) the so-called ‘new cultural dimension’ (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009) or globalisation dimension. In general, authors have tended to connect this cleavage to the social distinction between winners and losers of globalisation. The idea being that higher educated voters can cope better with the economic and social pressures that are the result of globalisation, such as the increased competition for jobs by foreign workers, compared to lower educated voters. This perspective neglects that these immigrant workers and their children

that form the ‘pressure’ of globalisation are also voters. An immigrant party is likely to active this cleavage choosing to engage in conflict with the radical right-wing populist parties that stand on the ‘closed’ position of this dimension. All in all, it is likely that an immigrant party appeal to voters with more ‘open’ views on this dimension.

5. *Globalisation Dimension hypothesis*: Among voters with a migration background those who have more ‘open’ views on the globalisation dimension are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than those with more ‘closed’ views on the globalisation dimension.

This globalisation dimension encompasses attitudes towards a large range of issues: EU integration, immigration, civic integration, anti-discrimination measures, the place of Islam in Western societies and law and order policies. For immigrants some of the elements of this globalisation dimension may matter more. Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst (2011, 10), Moutselos (2015, 12), Cain, Kiewart, and Uhlaner (1991) and See Lim et al. (2006) all emphasise the importance of the experience of discrimination in the formation of political preferences for immigrants. This may mean that citizens with a migration background who are more opposed to discriminatory policies and practices are more likely to vote for an immigrant party.

6. *Discrimination Hypothesis*: Among voters with a migration background those who are more opposed to discriminatory government policies are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than those who are not or less opposed to such policies.

Finally, there may be a generational difference. Three patterns may underlie this difference: first, younger voters with a migrant background may be more aware of discrimination. As this group has a better grasp of the Dutch language than older generations, they may be better able to follow Dutch news and therefore the anti-immigration statements of the radical right. They may also have greater expectations of being treated as equals to the Dutch citizens without a migration background with whom they grew up and attended school together, but still experience discrimination, making the experience more negative (Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012, 159). Indeed, in their study of the immigration paradox, Ten Teije, Coenders, and Verkuyten (2013, 284) find that second generation residents of the Netherlands with a migration background have less positive attitudes towards native Dutch people than first generation immigrants. These experiences may enforce their willingness to vote for an immigrant party.

Second, the political period in which voters are socialised is important for their voting behaviour (Wagner and Kritzinger 2012). If voters with a migrant background are socialised in a period when social-democrats were more progressive on questions of civic integration and immigration, they may be more likely to stay loyal to social-democrats even when these parties move to more conservative positions on these issues. While voters with a migrant background that were socialised in a period when social-democrats were more conservative on issues of civic integration and immigration will be less inclined to remain loyal to the centre-left. As we will discuss below, the Dutch Labour Party used to be more progressive on civic integration and immigration and has become more conservative on

these issues since 2002. This may lead younger generations to be less loyal to the Labour Party.

Finally, there is a difference between generations on how they get information: younger Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan generations rely more on the internet than older generations (Huysmans and de Haan 2008, 140; Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012, 159). In contrast older generations watch television more often including television from their country of origin (Huysmans and de Haan 2008, 134). This means that parties that rely on the mobilisation of voters online will tend to have younger electorates. As we will discuss below, DENK has a strong online following. These generational differences may be weakened by the fact that younger generations are slightly less conservative on moral issues than older generations, which is reflected in the fact that they attend Mosque less often and are slightly more accepting of homosexuality (Huijink 2014, 44; Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012, 73)

7. *Generation hypothesis*: Among voters with a migration background younger voters are more likely to vote for an immigrant party than older voters.

3. Case

DENK was founded on 9 February 2015, through a breakaway of two members of the mainstream social-democratic Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA). The name DENK has two meanings. In Dutch it means 'Think' and in Turkish it means 'Equal'. The founders were Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. These Dutch-Turkish politicians were elected to parliament in 2012 on the list of the PvdA. Kuzu was elected on the basis of preference votes. They left the Labour Party after a conflict with Lodewijk Asscher, Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, who was also responsible for civic integration. In November 2014, he announced that the government would continue to monitor four religious organisations from Turkey. In the eyes of Asscher these organisations promoted that Dutch people from Turkish descent distanced themselves from Dutch norms and values. Kuzu and Öztürk believed that this continued surveillance constituted a politics of exclusion. Kuzu and Öztürk were expelled from the Labour Parliamentary Party and founded their own group for opposition to these policies.

This newly founded party DENK presented itself as an emancipation movement of people with a migration background.⁴ It has a 'program with a social-democratic profile'⁵ and emphasises tolerance and mutual understanding. The manifesto prioritises fighting discrimination in all forms. On social-economic issues the party generally takes left-wing positions. It is not an explicitly Islamic party: 'we are a party where many Muslims will feel comfortable with, but also a lot non-Muslims who reject the cold right-wing [political] climate'.⁶ In this sense they counter-mobilise against the right-wing anti-immigrant mobilisation of the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV). The party also has a number of conservative positions: the party spoke out against the Dutch practice of euthanasia;⁷ the party does not recognise the events in Armenia between 1915 and 1923 as genocide;⁸ the party proposed chemical castration for child molesters;⁹ and the party opposed changing the system of organ donation to an opt-in system.

During the period 2014–2017 the party broadened itself, seeking explicitly to recruit members from Dutch-Antillean, Moroccan-Dutch and Surinamese-Dutch communities. The prominent Dutch-Surinamese TV-personality Sylvana Simons joined the party, as well as Farid Azarkan, the chair of the Dutch-Moroccan interest group (*Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland*; Cooperation League of Moroccans in the Netherlands). In December 2016, Simons left the party to found her own competing immigrant party, Article 1 (*Artikel 1*). She left because she felt too little support from the party leadership when she received racist death threats. She also felt little support for her focus on LGBT and women's emancipation.¹⁰

The election campaign of DENK did not focus strongly on traditional media, but instead it uses social media. Tunahan Kuzu has the second most likes on Facebook of any Dutch politician (after the prime minister Mark Rutte). In the election the party won 216,147 votes (2.0% of votes cast), sufficient for three seats in the lower house of the Dutch parliament. Table 1 shows private polling of the support of DENK in different ethnic groups: they indicate that 37–45% of Turkish-Dutch voters intended to vote DENK and 17–38% of Moroccan-Dutch voters intended to do this. 4–5% of Surinamese-Dutch voters and 3–4% of Dutch-Antillean voters were likely to vote for this party.¹¹

The party built up its own organisation: on 1 January 2016 DENK had 1055 members, by 1 January 2017 this was 3625 (DNPP 2017). The party founded a scientific institute (*Statera*, Latin for balance), a youth movement (*Oppositie*, Dutch for Opposition) and a women's organisation (*Durf*, Dutch for Dare).

Three factors help to understand the formation and success of the DENK. The Dutch electoral system, the politicisation of migration and the existing networks in immigrant communities in particular in the Dutch-Turkish community.

Because of its low electoral threshold (effectively voters need only 0.67% of all votes to win a seat) and the low requirements for new political parties, the Netherlands has seen a large number of new political parties run and enter parliament (Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). This helps to explain why DENK was the first immigrant party to win seats in West European parliament. DENK is not the first immigrant party in the Netherlands to run in elections. Local immigrant parties have existed in the Netherlands since the mid-1980s when immigrants were first given the right to vote in local elections but their success has been marginal and they have only occasionally entered municipal councils (Michon and Tillie 2011, 78; Rath 1985, 52). In 2006 the first of these local parties of immigrants was successful in municipal council election in a major city.¹² Since at least 1989 immigrant parties have been running in the national election.¹³ Similar local parties of immigrants have run in local elections in the UK (Peace 2013, 8), Denmark and Norway.

Table 1. Polling Results of DENK among ethnic groups.

	Kantar December 2016 (%)	I&O February 2017 (%)	Etnobarometer February 2017 (%)	Etnobarometer March 2017 (%)
Turkish-Dutch	37	32	40	45
Moroccan-Dutch	17	26	34	38
Surinamese-Dutch	<10	2	4	5
Dutch-Antillean	<10		3	4
Other immigrant groups	<10	5	–	–

In addition to the electoral institutions, DENK has also been successful because the Dutch-Turkish community is a well-organised constituency (Fennema and Tillie 1999). After the Second World War, immigrants came to the Netherlands from two major sources (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011). There were immigrant workers, many of whom came from Turkey and Morocco. They started to come in the late 1960s and they were followed by family migration. A second group of immigrants came from the (former) colonies of the Netherlands, first from Indonesia (after the Indonesian National Revolution 1945–1949), then from Suriname (as the country became independent in the 1975) and finally from the Dutch Antilles, which still are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In 2014, 146,855 citizens of the Netherlands are of Dutch-Antillean descent and 348,291 residents of the Netherlands were of Surinamese descent (CBS 2017a). In 2014 around 320,782 Dutch citizens have both a Dutch and Moroccan passport and the same 312,080 have a Dutch and Turkish passport (CBS 2017b). These different groups participate in different ways in politics. Dutch-Turkish citizens participate more often in elections than Dutch-Moroccan or Dutch-Surinamese do and even at equivalent levels of Dutch citizens without a migration background (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 709; Michon and Vermeulen 2013, 606); they also participate more in politics in other ways than voting, read local politics news more often, have more political interest and have greater trust in politics compared to other groups (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 709–712). They also tend to engage more in co-ethnic voting than other groups (Michon and Tillie 2011, 78). The social capital approach that Fennema and Tillie (1999, 712) have developed has been used explain the political behaviour: there are many Turkish voluntary organisations and these organisations form strong networks. A large share of Turkish-Dutch voters is a member of such organisations (Michon and Vermeulen 2013, 604). Compared to other groups, Dutch-Turks are stronger embedded into their own ethnic community (Michon and Vermeulen 2013, 597). Networks of Dutch-Turkish civil organisations socialise their members into civic virtues, which are transferred to the Dutch-Turkish community as a whole (Michon and Vermeulen 2013, 598). It is notable that even in the mid-1990s many of these organisations were extremely religious or nationalist and had authoritarian tendencies (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Fennema and Tillie (1999, 723) saw this tendency towards authoritarianism not as necessarily bad for the democratic process: ‘to have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all.’ DENK has been able to win three seats in parliament without a strong presence in traditional media, instead it built on civic networks, both online and offline. The fact that the private polling indicates that there is strong support for DENK among Turkish-Dutch voters can be explained by these strong civic networks.

In addition to the open electoral system and the well-organised constituency, DENK’s success can also be explained by the politicisation of Islam. These Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans are predominantly Muslim: large majorities of Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans identify as Muslim.¹⁴ However, they live in a country that is quite secular, where Islam is more and more cast into a negative light (Vermeulen, Michon, and Tillie 2014, 233). Since the 1990s, civic integration, immigration and the place of Islam in the Netherlands has become increasingly politicised. Three radical right-wing populist parties rose, mobilising Dutch voters by their opposition to immigration and their opposition to public expressions of Islam. Meanwhile the centre-right parties

moved to right on these issues in order to bolster their electoral position (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008). In this political context the social-democratic Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA) had to position itself. Its positioning was inconsistent: sometimes it sought to defuse the issue by focusing on economic issues, on other times it chose to position itself explicitly as a multicultural party but also adopted more conservative, closed, monocultural policies (Bale et al. 2010). The party had to balance appealing to its working-class base, culturally liberal and cosmopolitan higher educated voters and immigrant communities, including Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch voters, which in large pluralities voted for this party. When the Labour Party took actions in-line with a more right-wing course in 2014, this caused a fissure within its own party and it drove a wedge between Islamic, and specifically Dutch-Turkish communities and the party.

4. Methods

4.1 Sample construction

The problem of studying the political behaviour of immigrants and citizens with a migration background is that in standard surveys of voters, the number of respondents with a migration background is too little to say something certain about them. Private pollsters in the Netherlands had great difficulty estimating the share of votes for DENK because their panels had insufficient respondents with a migration background (Beer and Koenen 2016; Beijen and Kanne 2017). In political science research about immigration authors have used inventive methods: Voicu and Comşa (2014) exploited the large-N of the EVS to study turn-out of immigrant voters. Wüst (2000, 2004) combines multiple probability samples to gather sufficient immigrant voters. In the city of Amsterdam, researchers have held ‘shadow elections’ for every municipal council election in Amsterdam since 1986 in areas with high immigrant populations (Kranendonk et al. 2014, 6). Fisher et al. (2015), Moutselos (2015) and Bergh and Bjørklund (2011, 314) use a separate, probability survey of ethnic voters. They represent some of the only direct tests of how voters with a migration background vote.

Like Voicu and Comşa (2014) and Wüst (2000, 2004), we throw out a large net to assemble a sample with sufficient share of immigrant voters. We use the respondents from the online Vote Advice Application *Kieskompas* (Krouwel, Vitiello, and Wall 2012). It does not offer a representative sample of Dutch citizens, but the large number of respondents allows us to assemble it after data collection. In 2017, 1,100,656 respondents provided information about their political preferences to the VAA during the election campaign, of which 136,745 answered additional questions about their background. We use this large sample to *construct* a representative sample of Dutch voters with and without an immigration background. We construct matching sample (McCready 2006, 150–151). We take a probability sample of the population and for every respondent in that a sample we taken one from the VAA data set that is similar on all relevant variables (Daniel 2012, 91; Rivers 2006). In this way we create a data set that is equivalent to the probability sample. One issue with a matching sample is that it is not stable: if two or more respondents from the VAA sample are both similar to a respondent from the probability sample on all relevant variables, the respondent can only be chosen randomly. The result of this is that coefficients and estimates can

differ from sample to sample. To solve this, we bootstrap our results. Instead of using one randomly drawn sample, we draw 100 samples and calculate coefficients and diagnostics as an average of those 100 samples.

We construct two matched subsamples from the population with and without a migration background. To construct the subsample for the population without a migration background, we use a probability sample from the private polling company IPSOS from the ninth week of 2017. We match every respondent in this sample on four variables (age, gender, education level and party choice in 2017). The sample has 1189 respondents. For every respondent, we picked a user in the VAA dataset that had the same gender, level of education and intended to vote for the same party on the 2017 parliamentary election.¹⁵ We excluded respondents that had a missing variable on any of the variables included in the study as well as respondents that were Muslim (see below). This left 33,961 respondents to sample from. If there were two or more matches, the respondent that had the closest age was selected. If there were two or more matches with the same age, a respondent was randomly selected. Four per cent of the respondents in the probability sample could not be matched to a user in the VAA and were excluded from analysis. This approach allows us to deal with the problem that in VAAs, like many online surveys and panels, tend to under-cover specific groups because they are self-selected (Bethlehem 2010): young men with higher education are overrepresented in VAA data sets compared to the total voting population.

We constructed a separate subsample for the population with a migration background. We chose respondents that were Muslim to this end. Research of immigrant voting behaviour has focused on immigrants, ethnic minorities, people of non-Western origins or visible minorities (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013, 565). For three reasons we think that choosing to focus on Muslims is justified: first, the Islam as a religion plays a central role in the political discourse in the Netherlands about immigration and civic integration. Being a Muslim can also become 'racialised' (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013, 565). The political discussion of exclusion and societal discrimination follow this line. Second, this issue played a pivotal role in the formation of DENK. Third, the existing evidence suggests that DENK mainly received votes from Muslims: Table 1 shows the party received strong support from Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch communities, which are predominantly Muslim. We believe that by looking at Muslim voters we have a good grasp of the kind of voters with a migration background that are likely to vote for DENK. Having data on the preferences of a larger range of voters with a migration background and results for specific ethnic groups would have been quite interesting but those are not categories in the VAA data. We construct a matched subsample for Muslims. Out of all the 136,745 respondents who answered additional questions 595 are Muslim. We only sample from respondents that have answered every question we have used (286 respondents). We construct a matching sample, but here we do not have a data set to match on. Instead we use the actual distribution of Moroccan and Turkish residents of the Netherlands on education level (in two levels), age (in five categories) and gender from CBS (2017c). We create a subsample of 118 respondents. The two matched subsamples were merged for the data analysis. Appendix 1 presents the results for the 'population' data without the matching.

4.2 Variables

Vote intention for DENK is the dependent variable. As these data are binary we use logistic regression, including a number of independent variables to test our hypotheses. In order to test the *immigrant hypothesis*, we use the variable whether the respondent is Muslim (that is the same variable that divides the two subsamples constructed above). To ease interpretation of the interaction effects the value is zero for respondents are Muslim and one for respondents that are not. In order to test the *political cynicism hypothesis*, we use a five-item political cynicism scale. We use a single item indicator (concerning euthanasia) to test the *moral dimension hypothesis*. To test the economic dimension hypothesis we use a two-item scale. We use an 11-item scale to test the *globalisation dimension hypothesis*. We separate one of these items, concerning ethnic profiling by the police, out to test the *discrimination hypothesis*. In those analyses we use a 10-item ‘smaller’ globalisation dimension. The discrimination and the 10-item globalisation scale are correlated ($r = 0.58$ – significant at the 0.01-level), but we are specifically interested at the effect of the discrimination item when controlling for the other globalisation items. All scales are sufficiently strong as indicated by a Mokken scaling analysis (Mokken 1971). To test the *generation hypothesis*, we include the year of birth of the respondent. This is different from the sample construction where for Muslim respondents we had to use five age categories because no more precise data on the Turkish-Dutch and Turkish-Moroccan populations were available, here we can use the full range of this variable. We also employ a number of control variables: whether the respondent is higher educated (that is whether the respondent has a degree from a university or a university of applied sciences), and the gender of the respondent (whether the respondent is male). All independent variables are re-calculated so that the minimum is zero and the maximum is one to ease comparison. Diagnostics are reported in Table 2. Appendix 2 lists the items used.

5. Results

Table 3 presents two regression analyses. One analysis includes the globalisation dimension and one instead uses a discrimination item and the smaller globalisation dimension

Table 2. Descriptives and diagnostics.

Variable	Mean	Med.	SD	Min	Max	N _i	H	Lower	Higher
Religion	0.91	–	–	0	1	1	–	Not Muslim	Muslim
Higher educated	0.36	–	–	0	1	1	–	Lower or middle educated	Higher educated
Male	0.49	–	–	0	1	1	–	Female	Male
Year of birth	0.54	0.53	0.23	0	1	1	–	Older	Younger
Votes for DENK	0.02	–	–	0	1	1	–	Does not vote for DENK	Votes for DENK
Political cynicism	0.61	0.66	0.25	0	1	5	0.78	Low cynicism	High cynicism
Economic dimension	0.69	0.75	0.24	0	1	2	0.49	Right	Left
Moral dimension	0.71	0.75	0.29	0	1	1	–	Progressive	Conservative
Globalisation dimension	0.59	0.59	0.20	0	1	11	0.38	Open	Closed
Discrimination item	0.66	0.75	0.31	0	1	1	–	Anti-discrimination	Pro-discrimination
Smaller globalisation dimension	0.58	0.58	0.19	0	1	10	0.37	Open	Closed

Table 3. Results of regressions.

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	−0.86*** (0.21)	−0.72*** (0.21)
Religion ≠ Muslim	−23.13*** (0.23)	−23.35*** (0.23)
Education = Higher educated	−0.90** (0.37)	−1.05*** (0.37)
Year of birth	3.23*** (0.19)	3.25*** (0.20)
Gender = Male	−0.10 (0.07)	−0.15** (0.07)
Political cynicism	1.50*** (0.14)	1.28*** (0.15)
Morality dimension	−2.73*** (0.12)	−2.70*** (0.12)
Economic dimension	−1.46*** (0.14)	−1.52*** (0.14)
Globalisation dimension	−4.20*** (0.22)	–
Discrimination item	–	−3.02*** (0.26)
Smaller globalisation dimension	–	−1.26*** (0.10)
Education = Higher educated* Religion ≠ Muslim	−1.00*** (0.37)	−0.83** (0.37)
Year of birth* Religion ≠ Muslim	2.34*** (0.20)	2.32*** (0.21)
Gender = Male* Religion ≠ Muslim	18.65*** (0.09)	18.97*** (0.08)
Political cynicism* Religion ≠ Muslim	6.15*** (0.16)	6.41*** (0.17)
Morality dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	2.81*** (0.11)	2.79*** (0.12)
Economic dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	−1.43*** (0.15)	−1.44*** (0.15)
Globalisation dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	−6.67*** (0.27)	–
Discrimination item* Religion ≠ Muslim	–	−6.70*** (0.30)
Smaller globalisation* Religion ≠ Muslim dimension	–	0.09 (0.12)
N	1255	1255
AIC	158	159

without this item separately. The estimates represent averages of the 100 matched samples that were drawn.

The first result is that DENK is supported consistently and almost uniquely by Muslims. In both models, there is a very strong negative effect of not being Muslim in voting for DENK: non-Muslims are almost 100% less likely to vote for DENK compared to Muslims. The data presented in Table 1 corroborate this evidence: the support for DENK is highly concentrated among Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan citizens, with non-Muslims vote for DENK at extremely low rates. These results are in-line with the *immigrant hypothesis*, which proposed that because of different mechanisms (socialisation into tightknit groups or some racial utility heuristic) voters with a migration background are likely to vote for an immigrant party.

The results for political cynicism also support the hypothesis that DENK mobilises those voters with a migration background who distrust established political parties. The

coefficient for the 'political cynicism' variable, which concerns the effect for Muslim voters, shows that the party attracts politically cynical Muslim voters. The effect for non-Muslim voters can be calculated by combining this effect and the interaction effect. For as far as the party attracts non-Muslim voters these are also politically cynical. All in all, the *political cynicism hypothesis* is corroborated

The *moral dimension hypothesis* proposed that an immigrant party was more likely to mobilise morally conservative voters with a migration background as morally progressive voters are served well by social-democratic parties; those that disagree more with morally progressive stances of social-democrats are more likely to vote for a migrant party. We find that this is indeed the case: in both models, we find support for the idea that DENK performs well under morally conservative Muslim voters. Among non-Muslim voters there is no clear pattern.

The *economic dimension hypothesis* proposes that an immigrant party was similarly likely to appeal to economically right-wing voters with a migration background; again the idea is that left-wing immigrant voters are more likely to vote for a social-democratic party. Again the interaction indicates that the appeal of DENK among non-Muslim voters is not consistently and strongly related to economic preferences. This pattern is also sustained in every model. This provides evidence for the economic dimension hypothesis.

The *globalisation dimension hypothesis* proposes that an immigrant party mobilises voters with a migration background with 'open' views on issues of immigration, civic integration and law and order, as this is the cleavage that an immigrant party activates. Model 1 sustains this pattern. Of all coefficients for opinion dimensions, the coefficient for the globalisation dimension is largest. The interaction indicates that for as far as non-Muslim voters consider voting for this party, their position of this dimension matters. In Model 2 we separate out a single item on ethnic profiling by the police, this allows us to see the effects of voters' political attitudes towards discrimination separately from the globalisation dimension (on basis of the remaining ten items). The effect for the discrimination variable is quite clear: the discrimination item itself has a much larger effect than the remaining new culture items. Its effect is the strongest of all effects. This result is in line with the *discrimination hypothesis*, immigrant parties do better among Muslim voters who are more opposed to discrimination than among those who are not. Among non-Muslim voters the discrimination item also matters more.

The final hypothesis, the *generation hypothesis*, is that DENK would do better among younger Muslim voters, because the party campaigned heavily on social media which younger voters use, because younger voters were socialised during the 2000s (when the Labour Party became less pro-immigration) and because younger Muslim voters may be more sensitive to discrimination than older Muslim voters. We find that indeed younger Muslim voters are more likely to vote for DENK. We also include two control variables. They indicate that DENK polls well under lower educated voters but that there is no significant pattern for gender. The results for the entire sample instead of the match sample, closely match the results here where it comes to Muslim voters. The only pattern that is not corroborated is the effect of education level.

6. Conclusion

On the basis of the literature, we formulated seven hypotheses about what kind of voters DENK may attract. We proposed that on basis of mechanisms such as the racial utility heuristic and socialisation into ethnic civic networks, voters with a migration background would be more likely to vote for an immigrant party. This is supported by the evidence, which shows that Muslims are far more likely to support the party than non-Muslims. We also proposed that those citizens with a migration background who vote for an immigrant party are more likely to distrust established political parties. The idea being that if they still trusted established parties they could have voted for the social-democrats. The evidence also sustains this idea. In terms of policy preference for voters our hypotheses were corroborated: those who stand far from the social-democrats because on moral and economic issues more likely to vote for an immigrant party. Furthermore, we showed that the immigrant party was more likely to appeal to voters with a migration background with 'open' views on the globalisation dimension. Finally, we showed that political preferences regarding discrimination mattered in particular.

So what do these results mean for the literature on voters with a migration background? First and foremost, it shows that immigrant parties can be successful in mobilising a significant segment of the population with a migration background in an open political system. Patterns that have been observed in the literature on voters with a migration background are relevant here: this party does not appeal to voters without a migration background and its appeal is limited to what we defined here as the immigrant group, Muslims. The importance of political attitudes towards discrimination may show the importance of the experience of discrimination for formation of political and party preferences for voters with a migration background.

What do these results mean for the decline of social-democracy? The loss of the social-democrats in the Dutch general election of 2017 is an extreme case of the decline of social-democracy we see all over Western Europe, such as in France. The social-democratic coalition of cosmopolitan higher educated voters, left-wing working-class voters and voters with a migration background is falling apart. In many countries, citizens with a migration background do not really have other options than voting for the social-democrats. This analysis shows that voters with a migration background in particular those who are not loyal with social-democrats because they are younger and more cynical about politics and who are more distant from Labour Parties on economic and moral issues, are likely to vote for another option if it becomes viable.

And finally, what do these results mean for the formation of a globalisation cleavage? In a political cleavage, three elements come together: a consistent difference in opinion between groups of voters; these groups can be identified by sociological variables; and they are mobilised by different parties. For many West European countries, the parties that mobilised voters along the globalisation dimension, are greens and social-liberals on the one side and radical right-wing populists on the other side, which mobilise either higher educated or lower educated voters (Kriesi et al. 2008). This analysis shows that an immigrant party like DENK also mobilises voters along this dimension. Instead of mobilising the higher educated winners of globalisation, the party mobilises migrant communities. So instead of seeing two-way conflict between cosmopolitans and nationalists, we see the emergence a three-way conflict where an immigrant party with its own

separate base forms their own pole that does not necessarily align with social-democrats, social-liberals and greens. The immigrant party mobilises an electorate that differs from the support base of the left because of their moral conservatism and relatively right-wing views on economic matters. While it is less likely that parties elsewhere can repeat the success of DENK, which was able to win representation in large part due to the extremely open and proportional Dutch electoral system, the study does point to the fact that when thinking about the polarisation of the globalisation cleavage migrant communities should not be neglected, as they often are in models of society that pit the winners and losers of globalisation against each other. Moreover, these communities cannot be lumped together with the higher educated winners of globalisation, as for them, for instance, the abstract questions about globalisation are less important for understanding their voting behaviour than their attitudes towards concrete experiences of discrimination.

This study has two limitations. First, that we operationalised 'having a migration background' as 'being Muslim'. On basis of other samples of immigrant groups we showed that this is reasonable for this case. They show that the support for DENK is concentrated among Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch voters, which predominantly Muslim. The fact that with our data we could only operationalise being an immigrant in terms of being Muslim is a major weakness of this paper. On basis of our data we can say little about either the preferences of other immigrant communities, such as Surinamese-Dutch and Dutch-Antillean for DENK, and we cannot differentiate between the likelihood of different Muslim groups, such as Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch voters for DENK. Given the fact that the existing evidence suggests the support for DENK is concentrated among Muslim voters, we do not believe that the results are biased.

The second limitation of this study is the data. We used data from a non-probability sample (from a VAA): higher educated, young men tend to be overrepresented in VAAs. Despite the fact that matching sampling was used to make the data more representative for the population, the sample is unlikely to be as representative as a true probability sample. Yet at the same time, a true probability sample of the Dutch population would have too few respondents with a migration background to effectively model their voting behaviour. Future research may want to determine whether the patterns found in this study, also hold when using a probability sample of the Dutch population and its migrant communities.

Notes

1. Due anti-communism some immigrant groups tend to vote for centre-right parties (see Wüst (2000, 2004) and Cain et al. (1991)).
2. The *Bund Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (BHE/Alliance of those driven from their home and deprived of their rights), which was in the German *Bundestag* between 1953 and 1957 is also a party of immigrants (Stickler 2013). It sought to represent forced migrants from the areas Poland annexed after the Second World War but their appeal is different, as they represent immigrants with the same ethnicity as the host country.
3. One may also characterise the British party RESPECT as a party *for* immigrants. It was formed as a coalition of far left and Muslim political activists (Peace 2013, 3). In 2005, it won one seat in the British Parliament (twice). The far left-wing was the dominant wing of the organisation (Benedek 2007, 154), but the electoral support of RESPECT was concentrated in areas in London with a large number of Muslim voters (Peace 2013, 4). The party never presented itself as a party of, by and for immigrants, however (Peace 2013, 8).

4. Van Houten, M. (23/2/2017) "Namen en Shamen op het Binnenhof." *Trouw*
5. *Parool* (9/2/2015) "Ex-PvdA'ers komen met nieuwe partij in een 'naar Geert Wilders gevormde wereld'"
6. Niemantsverdriet, T. (9/2/2015) "Ook veel niet-Moslims zijn het gure rechtse klimaat zat." *NRC Handelsblad*
7. Stans, J. (23/2/2017) "DENK: Artsen trekken sneller stekker eruit bij allochtonen" *BNR* <https://www.bnr.nl/nieuws/politiek/10318994/denk-artsen-trekken-sneller-stekker-eruit-bij-allochtonen>
8. Program DENK 2017, 55
9. Program DENK 2017, 35
10. *NRC Handelsblad* (27/12/2016) "Vertrek Sylvana Simons leidt tot verbazing bij DENK"
11. The three cited studies have used different sources: El Kaddouri (2017), *Etnobarometer* (2017) combines online, telephone and face-to-face interviews. For groups that are underrepresented in the organisations online panel the organisation used telephonic and face-to-face interviews. It has a sample of 1792 individuals spread over four ethnic groups. Beijen and Kanne (2017) held face-to-face interviews with individuals with an ethnic background in majority ethnic neighbourhoods in Amsterdam. Beer and Koenen (2016) used all voters with a migration background in their online panel.
12. In 2006 the *Islam Democraten* (Islamic Democrats), a party with an Islamic foundation ran for the national elections and won seats in The Hague municipal council and so did the party that split from it, the *Partij van de Eenheid* (Party of Unity), in 2014. In the same year. NIDA ("vote" in Arabic), an Islam-inspired emancipation movement won two seats in the Rotterdam city council.
13. There are a number of immigrant parties that ran unsuccessfully: in 1989, there was the *Vooruitstrevende Minderhedenpartij* (Progressive Minority Party); in the 1994, 1998 and 2002 there was the *Vrije Indische Partij* (Free Indian Party), oriented at Dutch-Indonesian people. In 2003 there was the *Vooruitstrevende Integratiepartij* (Progressive Integration Party), a party of immigrants oriented at promotion civic integration. In 2006 there was the aforementioned Islamic Democrats and the *Solide Multiculturele Partij* (Solid Multicultural Party), a party founded by Dutch-Surinamese people, which wanted to promote the multicultural society. In 2017 the aforementioned *Artikel 1* also ran. The name of the party refers to the first article of Dutch constitution, which codifies the principle of equality before the law.
14. 72% of Dutch-Turks and 88% of Dutch-Moroccans self-identify as Muslims according to Michon and Vermeulen (2013, 600), while Maliepaard and Gijsberts (2012) see self-identification levels of 94% and 97%, respectively.
15. Matching those who did not know yet what they would vote for with those who did not know yet what to vote for.

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Regressions on all respondents

	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	–2.61*** (1.46)	–2.39 (1.48)
Religion ≠ Muslim	–6.46*** (1.94)	–6.58*** (1.95)
Education = Higher Educated	0.27 (0.33)	0.17 (0.34)
Year of Birth	2.77* (1.45)	2.52* (1.47)
Gender = Male	0.46 (0.37)	0.46 (0.37)
Political Cynicism	1.64** (0.72)	1.45* (0.74)
Morality Dimension	–2.42*** (0.50)	–2.42*** (0.51)
Economic Dimension	–1.06* (0.63)	–1.06* (0.55)
Globalisation Dimension	–1.81* (1.02)	–
Discrimination Item	–	–1.06* (0.55)
Smaller Globalisation Dimension	–	–0.64 (1.11)
Education = Higher Educated* Religion ≠ Muslim	–0.07 (0.50)	0.02 (0.50)
Year of Birth* Religion ≠ Muslim	0.17 (1.78)	0.25 (1.80)
Gender = Male* Religion ≠ Muslim	–0.00 (0.53)	0.03 (0.53)
Political Cynicism* Religion ≠ Muslim	3.44*** (1.05)	3.53*** (1.06)
Morality Dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	1.38* (0.71)	1.38* (0.72)
Economic Dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	0.07 (0.94)	0.04 (0.94)
Globalisation Dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	–2.83** (1.43)	–
Discrimination Item* Religion ≠ Muslim	–	–0.23 (0.85)
Smaller Globalisation Dimension* Religion ≠ Muslim	–	–2.47 (1.65)
N	55690	55690
AIC	862	861

Appendix 2. Items used

#	Dimension	Items
1	Economic	Large multinational companies pay too little tax in the Netherlands.
2	Economic	The taxes for the highest incomes should be higher.
3	Morality	Older people who believe that their life is complete, should be allowed to commit suicide with professional assistance
4	Globalisation	More money should be spent on defense.
5	Globalisation	Dutch people who went to Syria to fight should be barred from returning to the Netherlands.
6	Globalisation	The Netherlands should leave the EU.
7	Globalisation	It should be a crime to be in the Netherlands without a residency permit.
8	Globalisation	The Netherlands should take in fewer refugees.
9	Globalisation	Dutch citizens should have the right to repeal decisions of the Dutch parliament via referendum.
10	Globalisation	Spending for the Dutch public broadcasting corporation should be reduced.
13	Globalisation	Spending on development aid should be reduced.
14	Globalisation	Particular social groups that the police believe to be more often involved in crimes should be subject to stricter surveillance.
15	Globalisation	The privacy of Dutch citizens should be limited to fight terrorism.
16	Globalisation	Judges should more often impose incarceration instead of community service.
17	Political Cynicism	Politicians do not care for the opinions of people like me.
18	Political Cynicism	Too often, politicians are out for their own advantage.
19	Political Cynicism	Politicians do not realise the impact of their decisions for people like me.
20	Political Cynicism	Politicians are too far from me to represent me.